Facts
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and forced into exile. Pres. Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Phils under a revolutionary government. However, the ratification of the 1987 Constitution further strengthened the legitimacy of Mrs Aquino’s authority. The country was far from being stabilized, though, as continued threats from various sectors ranging from the rebels to the followers of the Marcoses and even those that were initiators of the people power revolution. The economy, too, of the country has its own challenges as it fights to relieve itself of the devastating effect of the Marcos abuse or accumulation of wealth and the accumulated foreign debt as a result of such abuses.
Mr. Marcos has signified, in his deathbed, to return to the Phils. But Mrs Aquino considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the his and his family’s return.
This petition is brought into by the Marcoses, asking the court to compel the responsible departments of government to grant documents for his return.
The petitioners invoke the Bill of Rights specifically the right of a person of liberty of abode and the right to travel. It has also mentioned the freedom of movement and the right to leave any country and to return to his country as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The respondents, on the other hand argues that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. The President has decided, as an executive act, to bar the return of the Marcoses because such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety. Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights as provided for in the Constitution.
Issue
Whether or not Ferdinand Marcos and his family will be allowed to go back to the Philippines and whether or not Pres Aquino acted with grave abuse of discretion on the decision not to allow the Marcoses to come back.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that President Aquino did not act with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former Pres Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Phils.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
ICMC vs Calleja G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
Facts
This is a case of an organization operating in the Philippines subjected to an attempt to organize a labor union among its employees. ICMC or the International Catholic Immigration Commission was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.
The Trade Union of the Philippines made initial actions, a process called certification election, for recognition of a labor union. The ICMC claims that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and hence enjoys diplomatic immunity.
The Med-Arbiter in the initial proceeding dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, however, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. This was the same decision rendered by the Director after ICMC asked for a reconsideration on the basis that it has now been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities as evidenced by Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC.
This case has also resolved another petition of the same nature, the International Rice Institute. This is why in the ruling of this case, mention of the IRRI case may be made from time to time.
Issue
Whether or not the ICMC is subject to the Labor Laws of the Phils and therefore, can be compelled to recognize labor unions and proceed with the certication election.
Ruling
The court granted ICMC’s petition to set aside the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Phil Govt and ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly provides:
Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
A brief look into the nature of international organizations and specialized agencies is in order. The term "international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality 5 such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. 6 They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest. 7 The United Nations, for instance, is an international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The term appears in Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting progress and international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by autonomous international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United Nations. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many different fields, e.g. in posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in their membership, some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. The Charter provides that those agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought into relationship with the United Nations by agreements entered into between them and the Economic and Social Council, are then to be known as "specialized agencies."
The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary international law has paved the way for the development of the concept of international immunities.
It is now usual for the constitutions of international organizations to contain provisions conferring certain immunities on the organizations themselves, representatives of their member states and persons acting on behalf of the organizations. A series of conventions, agreements and protocols defining the immunities of various international organizations in relation to their members generally are now widely in force; . . .
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. ? 1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission.
2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.
The Supreme Court in its decision to grant the petition mentioned strongly against the acts that shows a department’s antagonistic position on the resolution of this case, to wit :
En passant, the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore antagonistic positions assumed by two departments of the executive branch of government have been rectified and the resultant embarrassment to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the international community now, hopefully, effaced.
This is a case of an organization operating in the Philippines subjected to an attempt to organize a labor union among its employees. ICMC or the International Catholic Immigration Commission was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.
The Trade Union of the Philippines made initial actions, a process called certification election, for recognition of a labor union. The ICMC claims that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and hence enjoys diplomatic immunity.
The Med-Arbiter in the initial proceeding dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, however, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. This was the same decision rendered by the Director after ICMC asked for a reconsideration on the basis that it has now been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities as evidenced by Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC.
This case has also resolved another petition of the same nature, the International Rice Institute. This is why in the ruling of this case, mention of the IRRI case may be made from time to time.
Issue
Whether or not the ICMC is subject to the Labor Laws of the Phils and therefore, can be compelled to recognize labor unions and proceed with the certication election.
Ruling
The court granted ICMC’s petition to set aside the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification election.
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Phil Govt and ICMC shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly provides:
Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the specialized agencies, wherever located and by whomsoever held shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action.
The foregoing opinions constitute a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
A brief look into the nature of international organizations and specialized agencies is in order. The term "international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality 5 such that they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. 6 They are organized mainly as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have an interest. 7 The United Nations, for instance, is an international organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.
"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The term appears in Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter of the United Nations:
The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting progress and international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by autonomous international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United Nations. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many different fields, e.g. in posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in their membership, some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. The Charter provides that those agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought into relationship with the United Nations by agreements entered into between them and the Economic and Social Council, are then to be known as "specialized agencies."
The rapid growth of international organizations under contemporary international law has paved the way for the development of the concept of international immunities.
It is now usual for the constitutions of international organizations to contain provisions conferring certain immunities on the organizations themselves, representatives of their member states and persons acting on behalf of the organizations. A series of conventions, agreements and protocols defining the immunities of various international organizations in relation to their members generally are now widely in force; . . .
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual member States. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director and by Kapisanan.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus:
Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. ? 1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission.
2. In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.
The Supreme Court in its decision to grant the petition mentioned strongly against the acts that shows a department’s antagonistic position on the resolution of this case, to wit :
En passant, the Court is gratified to note that the heretofore antagonistic positions assumed by two departments of the executive branch of government have been rectified and the resultant embarrassment to the Philippine Government in the eyes of the international community now, hopefully, effaced.
Recognition of States
a) Tobar or Wilson Principle
The Tobar or Wilson was expressed in a treaty of the Central American Republics in 1907 at the suggestion of Foreign Minister Tobar of Ecuador and reiterated in 1931 by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. It states that the recognition of states shall not be extended to any government established by recognition, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.
b) Stimson Doctrine
The Stimson Doctrine is a policy of the United States federal government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932 to Japan and China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes affected by force.
Named after Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration (1929–1933), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in northeastern China following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on September 18, 1931.
The principles of this doctrine were also used in the U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles's declaration of July 23, 1940, on the non-recognition policy of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of three Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These principles were still applied until the de facto restoration of independence of these three Baltic nations in August 1991.
c) Estrada Doctrine
A recognition of states approach, also known as the Estrada doctrine, is a development on the earlier recognition of governments approach whereby a government would recognize another governments. This caused political problems following an unconstitutional change in the government of another state.
It is the policy of recognizing states rather than governments. It is an alternative to the method of express recognition, in which an express statement is made according or withholding recognition after each unconstitutional change of government, and tacit recognition in which, only under exceptional circumstances, is a recognition statement made.
It was first enunciated by Mexico's foreign minister Genaro Estrada, in 1930.
The Estrada Doctrine is the name of Mexico's core Foreign Policy ideal from 1930 to 2000. Its name derives from Genaro Estrada, Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the Presidency of Pascual Ortiz Rubio.
The Estrada Doctrine favored an enclosed view of sovereignty. It claimed that foreign governments should not judge, for good or bad, governments or changes in governments in other nations, because it would imply a breach to its sovereignty.[1]
During the Fox Administration (2000-2007), both Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda and Luis Ernesto Derbez, tried to discontinue this Doctrine.
States with no recognition
- Somaliland
Recognition by unrecognized states only
- Abkhazia
- Nagorno-Karabakh
- South Ossetia
- Transnistria
Limited recognition
- Kosovo
- Republic of China (Taiwan) (ROC)
- Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
Majority recognition
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Israel
- Liechtenstein
- North Korea
- South Korea
- Palestine
- People's Republic of China (PRC)
- Slovakia
-
The Tobar or Wilson was expressed in a treaty of the Central American Republics in 1907 at the suggestion of Foreign Minister Tobar of Ecuador and reiterated in 1931 by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. It states that the recognition of states shall not be extended to any government established by recognition, civil war, coup d’etat or other forms of internal violence until the freely elected representatives of the people have organized a constitutional government.
b) Stimson Doctrine
The Stimson Doctrine is a policy of the United States federal government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932 to Japan and China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes affected by force.
Named after Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration (1929–1933), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in northeastern China following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on September 18, 1931.
The principles of this doctrine were also used in the U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles's declaration of July 23, 1940, on the non-recognition policy of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of three Baltic countries — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These principles were still applied until the de facto restoration of independence of these three Baltic nations in August 1991.
c) Estrada Doctrine
A recognition of states approach, also known as the Estrada doctrine, is a development on the earlier recognition of governments approach whereby a government would recognize another governments. This caused political problems following an unconstitutional change in the government of another state.
It is the policy of recognizing states rather than governments. It is an alternative to the method of express recognition, in which an express statement is made according or withholding recognition after each unconstitutional change of government, and tacit recognition in which, only under exceptional circumstances, is a recognition statement made.
It was first enunciated by Mexico's foreign minister Genaro Estrada, in 1930.
The Estrada Doctrine is the name of Mexico's core Foreign Policy ideal from 1930 to 2000. Its name derives from Genaro Estrada, Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the Presidency of Pascual Ortiz Rubio.
The Estrada Doctrine favored an enclosed view of sovereignty. It claimed that foreign governments should not judge, for good or bad, governments or changes in governments in other nations, because it would imply a breach to its sovereignty.[1]
During the Fox Administration (2000-2007), both Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda and Luis Ernesto Derbez, tried to discontinue this Doctrine.
States with no recognition
- Somaliland
Recognition by unrecognized states only
- Abkhazia
- Nagorno-Karabakh
- South Ossetia
- Transnistria
Limited recognition
- Kosovo
- Republic of China (Taiwan) (ROC)
- Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)
- Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)
Majority recognition
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Israel
- Liechtenstein
- North Korea
- South Korea
- Palestine
- People's Republic of China (PRC)
- Slovakia
-
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
MONTEVIDEO CONFERENCE
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States was a treaty (which was later accepted as part of customary international law) signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933, at the Seventh International Conference of American States.
The convention sets out the definition, rights and duties of statehood. Most well-known is article 1, which sets out the four criteria for statehood that have sometimes been recognized as an accurate statement of customary international law:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Furthermore, the first sentence of article 3 explicitly states that "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states." This is known as the declarative theory of statehood.
There have also been attempts to further broaden the convention's definition, although they have gained less support. Founders of non-territorial micronations commonly assert that the requirement in the Montevideo Convention of a defined territory is in some way wrong-headed, for largely unspecified reasons. Some non-territorial entities, notably the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, are indeed considered subjects of international law, but these do not aspire to statehood
The states that signed this convention are: Honduras, United States of America, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Cuba[2]. However, as a restatement of customary international law, the Montevideo Convention merely codified existing legal norms and its principles and therefore does not apply merely to the signatories, but to all subjects of international law as a whole.
The European Union, in the principal statement of its Badinter Committee,[4] follows the Montevideo Convention in its definition of a state: by having a territory, a population, and a political authority. The committee also found that the existence of states was a question of fact, while the recognition by other states was purely declaratory and not a determinative factor of statehood.[5]
Switzerland, although not a member of the European Union, adheres to the same principle, stating that "neither a political unit needs to be recognized to become a state, nor does a state have the obligation to recognize another one. At the same time, neither recognition is enough to create a state, nor does its absence abolish it."[6]
Source : Wikipedia
The convention sets out the definition, rights and duties of statehood. Most well-known is article 1, which sets out the four criteria for statehood that have sometimes been recognized as an accurate statement of customary international law:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Furthermore, the first sentence of article 3 explicitly states that "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states." This is known as the declarative theory of statehood.
There have also been attempts to further broaden the convention's definition, although they have gained less support. Founders of non-territorial micronations commonly assert that the requirement in the Montevideo Convention of a defined territory is in some way wrong-headed, for largely unspecified reasons. Some non-territorial entities, notably the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, are indeed considered subjects of international law, but these do not aspire to statehood
The states that signed this convention are: Honduras, United States of America, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Cuba[2]. However, as a restatement of customary international law, the Montevideo Convention merely codified existing legal norms and its principles and therefore does not apply merely to the signatories, but to all subjects of international law as a whole.
The European Union, in the principal statement of its Badinter Committee,[4] follows the Montevideo Convention in its definition of a state: by having a territory, a population, and a political authority. The committee also found that the existence of states was a question of fact, while the recognition by other states was purely declaratory and not a determinative factor of statehood.[5]
Switzerland, although not a member of the European Union, adheres to the same principle, stating that "neither a political unit needs to be recognized to become a state, nor does a state have the obligation to recognize another one. At the same time, neither recognition is enough to create a state, nor does its absence abolish it."[6]
Source : Wikipedia
ZIMBABWE CRISIS
Zimbabwe’s demographics :
Population: 12,576,742 (July, 2003 est.), 11,342,521 (July 2000 est.) The last census, in 2002, showed the population to be 11,600,000.
Age structure estimates for 2007:
0-14 years: 37.2% (male 2,308,731/female 2,266,027); this has fallen from around 40% over the last 10 years;
15-64 years: 59.3% (male 3,663,108/female 3,641,519); this has risen despite higher death rates due to tuberculosis and other diseases associated with AIDS;
65 years and over: 3.5% (male 198,867/female 232,891); not rising due to the sharp fall in life expectancy over the period 1992 to 2007. The Median age of the population, 20.1, is rising steadily due to a combination of lower birth rates and high death rates.
Population growth rate: 0.59% (2007 est.), 0.83% (2003 est.), 0.26% (2000 est.)
Birth rate: 27.7 births/1,000 population (2007 est.), 30.34 births/1,000 population (2003 est.), 25 births/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Death rate: 22.7 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.), 25.02 deaths/1,000 population (2003 est.), 22.43 deaths/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Net migration rate: Unknown due to illegal border crossing but possibly as high 15-18/1,000 population annually over the period 1999-2007.
Sex ratio:
at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
65 years and over: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003 est.), 1.03 male(s)/female (2000 est.)
total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
Infant mortality rate:
total: 66.47 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.), 62.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2000 est.)
female: 63.69 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.)
male: 69.17 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.)
Percentage of population malnourished: 45 percent
AIDS adult infection rate: 33.7% (2001 est.), 25% (1999 estimate).
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS: 2.3 million (2001 est.)
Deaths from AIDS: 200,000 (2001 est.), 160,000 annually (1999 estimate).
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 39.01 years (2003 est.), 37.78 years (2000 est.)
male: 40.09 years (2003 est.), 39.18 years (2000 est.)
female: 37.89 years (2003 est.), 36.34 years (2000 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.08 children born/woman (2007 est.), 3.66 children born/woman (2003 est.), 3.34 children born/woman (2000 est.)
Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write English total population: 90.7% (2003 est.), 85% (2000 est.) male: 94.2% (2003 est.), 90% (2000 est.) female: 87.2% (2003 est.), 80% (1995 est.)
The above demographics shows a pitiful state of a nation – a largely malnourished population, low life expectancy (an average persons dies at 39 years old), wide propagation of AIDS – a country with a very low quality of life and a very dim future for the people within. Now picture this country also in a political turmoil with at least two political parties fighting tooth and nail to take over. There are endless accusations of election fraud and bringing of suits to court to compel the authorities of justice to declare the rightful winner. The effect is greater suffering on the people and further threat to their existence.
Zimbabwe Rhodesia regained its independence as Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980 Its first elections took place on March 27-29, 1980. In accordance with the Lancaster compromise, black Zimbabweans competed for 80 out of the 100 seats in the House of Assembly with 20 seats reserved for whites. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won a majority with 57 seats while Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) won 27 seats and Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) won three. The Rhodesian Front won all 20 white seats.
In the meantime, ethnic divisions soon came back to the forefront of national politics. Tension between ZAPU and ZANU erupted with guerrilla activity starting again in Matabeleland in south-western Zimbabwe. Because of the unsettled security situation immediately after independence and the continuing anti government dissidence, the government kept in force a "state of emergency". This gave the government widespread powers under the "Law and Order Maintenance Act," including the right to detain persons without charge which it used quite widely. In 1983 to 1984 the government declared a curfew in areas of Matabeleland and sent in the army in an attempt to suppress dissidents. Credible reports surfaced of widespread violence and disregard for human rights by the security forces during these operations, and the level of political tension rose in the country as a result. The pacification campaign, known as the Gukuruhundi, or strong wind, resulted in at least 20,000 civilian deaths perpetrated by an elite, communist-trained brigade, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukurahundi. The situation evolved into a low level civil war.
ZANU-PF increased its majority in the 1985 elections, winning 67 of the 100 seats. The majority gave Mugabe the opportunity to start making changes to the constitution, including those with regard to land restoration. Fighting did not cease until Mugabe and Nkomo reached an agreement in December 1987 whereby ZAPU became part of ZANU-PF and the government changed the constitution to make Mugabe the country's first executive president and Nkomo one of two vice presidents.
Mugabe’s seemingly dictatorship government continued into the years. Elections in March 1990 resulted in another overwhelming victory for him and his party, which won 117 of the 120 election seats. Election observers estimated voter turnout at only 54% and found the campaign neither free nor fair though balloting met international standards. Unsatisfied with a de facto one-party state, Mugabe called on the ZANU-PF Central Committee to support the creation of a de jure one-party state in September 1990 and lost. The government began further amending the constitution. The judiciary and human rights advocates fiercely criticised the first amendments enacted in April 1991 because they restored corporal and capital punishment and denied recourse to the courts in cases of compulsory purchase of land by the government. The general health of the civilian population also began to significantly flounder and by 1997, 25% of the population of Zimbabwe had been infected by HIV, the AIDS virus. Students, trade unionists, and workers often demonstrated to express their discontent with the government. Students protested in 1990 against proposals for an increase in government control of universities and again in 1991 and 1992 when they clashed with police.
Zimbabwe began experiencing a period of considerable political and economic upheaval in 1999. Opposition to President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government grew considerably after the mid-1990s in part due to worsening economic and human rights conditions.[14] The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was established in September 1999 as an opposition party founded by trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai.
The MDC's first opportunity to test opposition to the Mugabe government came in February 2000, when a referendum was held on a draft constitution proposed by the government. Among its elements, the new constitution would have permitted President Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, granted government officials immunity from prosecution, and authorised government seizure of white-owned land. The referendum was handily defeated. Shortly thereafter, the government, through a loosely organised group of war veterans, sanctioned an aggressive land redistribution program often characterised by forced expulsion of white farmers and violence against both farmers and farm employees
Parliamentary elections held in June 2000 were marred by localised violence, and claims of electoral irregularities and government intimidation of opposition supporters. Nonetheless, the MDC succeeded in capturing 57 of 120 seats in the National Assembly.
In the years afterwards, Zimbabwe’s conditioned worsened. The political tension continued leading to economic deterioration manifested by a inflation in August 2006 that caused the government to replace its existing currency. The sufferings of the Zimbabweans continued on. The educational system in Zimbabwe which was once regarded as among the best in Africa, has gone into crisis because of the country’s economic meltdown.
Zimbabwe held a presidential election along with a parliamentary election on March 29, 2008. The three major candidates were Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Simba Makoni, an independent. The election was expected, because of Zimbabwe's dire economic situation, to provide President Mugabe with his toughest electoral challenge to date. On 2 April 2008, The Zimbabwe election commission confirmed that Mugabe and his party, ZANU-PF, lost control of Parliament. According to unofficial polling, ZANU-PF took 94 seats, and the main opposition party MDC took 96 seats. On 3 April 2008 Zimbabwean government forces began cracking down on the main opposition party and arrested at least two foreign journalists covering the disputed presidential election, including a correspondent for The New York Times.
The economic meltdown and repressive political measures in Zimbabwe has led to a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. An estimated 3.4 million Zimbabweans, a quarter of the population, had fled abroad by mid 2007. Some 3 million of these have gone to South Africa. Aside from those who fled into the neighbouring countries, an estimated 570,000 people are displaced within the borders of the country, many of whom remain in transit camps and have limited access to assistance. Most of the displaced have been victims of the Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 and continuing evictions and violent farm seizures. Their plight is virtually impossible to assess, as there has been no national survey of people displaced since 2005.
Again, the family has stepped into the situation as various human rights have been violated and as millions of people are forced out of their homes to escape the unbearableness of the situation. The United Nations Security Council has officially met on the issue on several occasions.
Then, following an off-the-record meeting, the Council issued a statement condemning "the campaign of violence against the political opposition" and expressing "its concern over the impact of the situation in Zimbabwe on the wider region.
After the election, an attempt supported by the United States and European countries, to have the Security Council declare the election illegitimate was blocked by South Africa, which argued that the Council was not in the business of certifying elections The Zimbabwean mission to the UN said in a letter on July 10 that a proposed resolution drafted by the US would likely leave Zimbabwe in a lawless state like Somalia and cause a civil war if it was passed. According to the letter, Zimbabwe was not a threat to other countries and consequently there was no basis for the proposed resolution; the letter also alleged that the proposed resolution was actually intended as punishment for Zimbabwe's land reform, and it said that the US and the UK were "ignor[ing] real, entrenched, fundamental and enduring issues that lie at the heart of Zimbabwe's internal politics". Additionally, the letter blamed the violence on the MDC.
Is the displacement of numerous members of a state a compelling reason to interfere in its affairs? Would a change in leadership or the stabilization of political power in a state result in better lives of individuals. Is Zimbabwe’s condition a result of the political struggle it underwent or is such present plight inevitable, a result of its unpreparedness or even unworthiness of independence? If you were part of the UN Security Council would you have supported a degree of interference in the Zimbabwe crisis?
Population: 12,576,742 (July, 2003 est.), 11,342,521 (July 2000 est.) The last census, in 2002, showed the population to be 11,600,000.
Age structure estimates for 2007:
0-14 years: 37.2% (male 2,308,731/female 2,266,027); this has fallen from around 40% over the last 10 years;
15-64 years: 59.3% (male 3,663,108/female 3,641,519); this has risen despite higher death rates due to tuberculosis and other diseases associated with AIDS;
65 years and over: 3.5% (male 198,867/female 232,891); not rising due to the sharp fall in life expectancy over the period 1992 to 2007. The Median age of the population, 20.1, is rising steadily due to a combination of lower birth rates and high death rates.
Population growth rate: 0.59% (2007 est.), 0.83% (2003 est.), 0.26% (2000 est.)
Birth rate: 27.7 births/1,000 population (2007 est.), 30.34 births/1,000 population (2003 est.), 25 births/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Death rate: 22.7 deaths/1,000 population (2007 est.), 25.02 deaths/1,000 population (2003 est.), 22.43 deaths/1,000 population (2000 est.)
Net migration rate: Unknown due to illegal border crossing but possibly as high 15-18/1,000 population annually over the period 1999-2007.
Sex ratio:
at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
under 15 years: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
65 years and over: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003 est.), 1.03 male(s)/female (2000 est.)
total population: 1.02 male(s)/female (2003, 2000 est.)
Infant mortality rate:
total: 66.47 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.), 62.25 deaths/1,000 live births (2000 est.)
female: 63.69 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.)
male: 69.17 deaths/1,000 live births (2003 est.)
Percentage of population malnourished: 45 percent
AIDS adult infection rate: 33.7% (2001 est.), 25% (1999 estimate).
HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS: 2.3 million (2001 est.)
Deaths from AIDS: 200,000 (2001 est.), 160,000 annually (1999 estimate).
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 39.01 years (2003 est.), 37.78 years (2000 est.)
male: 40.09 years (2003 est.), 39.18 years (2000 est.)
female: 37.89 years (2003 est.), 36.34 years (2000 est.)
Total fertility rate: 3.08 children born/woman (2007 est.), 3.66 children born/woman (2003 est.), 3.34 children born/woman (2000 est.)
Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write English total population: 90.7% (2003 est.), 85% (2000 est.) male: 94.2% (2003 est.), 90% (2000 est.) female: 87.2% (2003 est.), 80% (1995 est.)
The above demographics shows a pitiful state of a nation – a largely malnourished population, low life expectancy (an average persons dies at 39 years old), wide propagation of AIDS – a country with a very low quality of life and a very dim future for the people within. Now picture this country also in a political turmoil with at least two political parties fighting tooth and nail to take over. There are endless accusations of election fraud and bringing of suits to court to compel the authorities of justice to declare the rightful winner. The effect is greater suffering on the people and further threat to their existence.
Zimbabwe Rhodesia regained its independence as Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980 Its first elections took place on March 27-29, 1980. In accordance with the Lancaster compromise, black Zimbabweans competed for 80 out of the 100 seats in the House of Assembly with 20 seats reserved for whites. Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won a majority with 57 seats while Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) won 27 seats and Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) won three. The Rhodesian Front won all 20 white seats.
In the meantime, ethnic divisions soon came back to the forefront of national politics. Tension between ZAPU and ZANU erupted with guerrilla activity starting again in Matabeleland in south-western Zimbabwe. Because of the unsettled security situation immediately after independence and the continuing anti government dissidence, the government kept in force a "state of emergency". This gave the government widespread powers under the "Law and Order Maintenance Act," including the right to detain persons without charge which it used quite widely. In 1983 to 1984 the government declared a curfew in areas of Matabeleland and sent in the army in an attempt to suppress dissidents. Credible reports surfaced of widespread violence and disregard for human rights by the security forces during these operations, and the level of political tension rose in the country as a result. The pacification campaign, known as the Gukuruhundi, or strong wind, resulted in at least 20,000 civilian deaths perpetrated by an elite, communist-trained brigade, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukurahundi. The situation evolved into a low level civil war.
ZANU-PF increased its majority in the 1985 elections, winning 67 of the 100 seats. The majority gave Mugabe the opportunity to start making changes to the constitution, including those with regard to land restoration. Fighting did not cease until Mugabe and Nkomo reached an agreement in December 1987 whereby ZAPU became part of ZANU-PF and the government changed the constitution to make Mugabe the country's first executive president and Nkomo one of two vice presidents.
Mugabe’s seemingly dictatorship government continued into the years. Elections in March 1990 resulted in another overwhelming victory for him and his party, which won 117 of the 120 election seats. Election observers estimated voter turnout at only 54% and found the campaign neither free nor fair though balloting met international standards. Unsatisfied with a de facto one-party state, Mugabe called on the ZANU-PF Central Committee to support the creation of a de jure one-party state in September 1990 and lost. The government began further amending the constitution. The judiciary and human rights advocates fiercely criticised the first amendments enacted in April 1991 because they restored corporal and capital punishment and denied recourse to the courts in cases of compulsory purchase of land by the government. The general health of the civilian population also began to significantly flounder and by 1997, 25% of the population of Zimbabwe had been infected by HIV, the AIDS virus. Students, trade unionists, and workers often demonstrated to express their discontent with the government. Students protested in 1990 against proposals for an increase in government control of universities and again in 1991 and 1992 when they clashed with police.
Zimbabwe began experiencing a period of considerable political and economic upheaval in 1999. Opposition to President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government grew considerably after the mid-1990s in part due to worsening economic and human rights conditions.[14] The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was established in September 1999 as an opposition party founded by trade unionist Morgan Tsvangirai.
The MDC's first opportunity to test opposition to the Mugabe government came in February 2000, when a referendum was held on a draft constitution proposed by the government. Among its elements, the new constitution would have permitted President Mugabe to seek two additional terms in office, granted government officials immunity from prosecution, and authorised government seizure of white-owned land. The referendum was handily defeated. Shortly thereafter, the government, through a loosely organised group of war veterans, sanctioned an aggressive land redistribution program often characterised by forced expulsion of white farmers and violence against both farmers and farm employees
Parliamentary elections held in June 2000 were marred by localised violence, and claims of electoral irregularities and government intimidation of opposition supporters. Nonetheless, the MDC succeeded in capturing 57 of 120 seats in the National Assembly.
In the years afterwards, Zimbabwe’s conditioned worsened. The political tension continued leading to economic deterioration manifested by a inflation in August 2006 that caused the government to replace its existing currency. The sufferings of the Zimbabweans continued on. The educational system in Zimbabwe which was once regarded as among the best in Africa, has gone into crisis because of the country’s economic meltdown.
Zimbabwe held a presidential election along with a parliamentary election on March 29, 2008. The three major candidates were Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and Simba Makoni, an independent. The election was expected, because of Zimbabwe's dire economic situation, to provide President Mugabe with his toughest electoral challenge to date. On 2 April 2008, The Zimbabwe election commission confirmed that Mugabe and his party, ZANU-PF, lost control of Parliament. According to unofficial polling, ZANU-PF took 94 seats, and the main opposition party MDC took 96 seats. On 3 April 2008 Zimbabwean government forces began cracking down on the main opposition party and arrested at least two foreign journalists covering the disputed presidential election, including a correspondent for The New York Times.
The economic meltdown and repressive political measures in Zimbabwe has led to a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. An estimated 3.4 million Zimbabweans, a quarter of the population, had fled abroad by mid 2007. Some 3 million of these have gone to South Africa. Aside from those who fled into the neighbouring countries, an estimated 570,000 people are displaced within the borders of the country, many of whom remain in transit camps and have limited access to assistance. Most of the displaced have been victims of the Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 and continuing evictions and violent farm seizures. Their plight is virtually impossible to assess, as there has been no national survey of people displaced since 2005.
Again, the family has stepped into the situation as various human rights have been violated and as millions of people are forced out of their homes to escape the unbearableness of the situation. The United Nations Security Council has officially met on the issue on several occasions.
Then, following an off-the-record meeting, the Council issued a statement condemning "the campaign of violence against the political opposition" and expressing "its concern over the impact of the situation in Zimbabwe on the wider region.
After the election, an attempt supported by the United States and European countries, to have the Security Council declare the election illegitimate was blocked by South Africa, which argued that the Council was not in the business of certifying elections The Zimbabwean mission to the UN said in a letter on July 10 that a proposed resolution drafted by the US would likely leave Zimbabwe in a lawless state like Somalia and cause a civil war if it was passed. According to the letter, Zimbabwe was not a threat to other countries and consequently there was no basis for the proposed resolution; the letter also alleged that the proposed resolution was actually intended as punishment for Zimbabwe's land reform, and it said that the US and the UK were "ignor[ing] real, entrenched, fundamental and enduring issues that lie at the heart of Zimbabwe's internal politics". Additionally, the letter blamed the violence on the MDC.
Is the displacement of numerous members of a state a compelling reason to interfere in its affairs? Would a change in leadership or the stabilization of political power in a state result in better lives of individuals. Is Zimbabwe’s condition a result of the political struggle it underwent or is such present plight inevitable, a result of its unpreparedness or even unworthiness of independence? If you were part of the UN Security Council would you have supported a degree of interference in the Zimbabwe crisis?
SUDAN CONFLICT
How can poverty, racial differences and geophysical changes transform into a political issue that manifests itself in war, civil unrest, mass killings, displacements and even abuse of women and children? What internal factors and external influences aggravate the sufferings of this already ravaged country? What can the world do to help a country that is a member of its family of nations? These questions continue to hound us as solutions to end the Sudan conflict have increasingly become a mission of those affected by the crisis.
The conflict began in February of 2003. The conflict has left as many as 400,000 dead from violence and disease. It is estimated that 100,000 have died each year because of government attacks. The Sudan government’s claim that over 9,000 people have been killed is seen as a gross underestimate. As many as 2.5 million are thought to have been displaced as of October, 2006. The Sudanese government has suppressed information by jailing and killing witnesses since 2004 and tampered with evidence such as mass graves to eliminate forensic values. Government forces and allied militia had committed widespread and consistent war crimes and crimes against humanity including murder, torture, mass rape, summary executions and arbitrary detention.The phenomenon has been described in media as the most blatant threat of genocide since Rwanda in 1994. There has even been a description of this situation as “ethnic cleansing or genocide” to connote a forcible transfer or even eradication of a population. The British Government has described the need for a solution as “the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today”.
The civil war that has afflicted the country almost continuously since independence in 1956 can be seen as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the black African, and predominantly Christian or animist, south. At a more detailed level, other features of the conflict emerge. Sudan is ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist2 regime under General Omar Al-Bashir, which has its powerbase in the mainly Arab and Muslim north of the country. The centre and south is inhabited by a mixture of different African linguistic groups, which are mainly Christian or animist. Southern groups, most notably the Dinkadominated Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), have repeatedly sought to gain significant autonomy or independence from Khartoum, and some have resorted to armed struggle to achieve this.
The current conflict has its origins in decades of economic and political marginalisation, and tension over increasingly scarce farmland and water resources. Prolonged drought and desertification in northern Darfur pushed nomadic groups south where they came into conflict over water resources with the farming tribes of the centre. Administrative boundary changes imposed by the predominantly Arab regime in Khartoum served to alienate the farming tribes, as did government backing for the loose collection of ‘Janjaweed’ (or ‘Janjaweit’) nomadic militias, which has come to comprise several thousand fighters of mainly Arab extraction. An influx of modern weaponry in recent decades has increased the loss of life in these disputes. Two predominantly black rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), came to prominence in Darfur during 2003.5 Both groups cited concerns that Darfur would lose out politically and economically in the division of power and resources (particularly oil revenue) between Khartoum and the South, in the event of a settlement in the broader civil war.
Open conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed SLM/A and the JEM took advantage of turmoil within the al-Bashir regime and launched attacks on government military bases. A series of rebel successes ensued during the first half of 2003, before government forces regrouped and responded with a counter-insurgency campaign. Government-backed Janjaweed militia fighters carried out raids on communities suspected of aiding or sympathising with the rebels, and it is the humanitarian impact of these attacks which forms the core of the present crisis.
A 45-day ceasefire was agreed on 8 April 2004 to allow humanitarian access to the displaced population. The N’djamena agreement, which was mediated by Chad, was finalised after a week-long delay caused by disputes over the presence of international observers. The Sudanese Government objected to the involvement of observers from the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the United States and the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. A compromise was reached under which only the African Union would monitor the political negotiations, and the other observers would be present for discussions on humanitarian issues. The agreement included provisions for a ceasefire commission with international representation, and a commitment from the Sudanese Government to control its allies and ensure their compliance. The parties also agreed to open negotiations on a political solution to the conflict, free all political prisoners, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The United Nations, has exerted its influence over the crisis by establishing a resolution and initiating actions to achieve the following objectives :
1. to ensure the protection of civilians and to facilitate humanitarian access to the affected population
2. to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and to provide protection for them
3. to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel and their assets.
Intense world influence had been placed on Sudan to end the conflict. In fact, the Bush administration said it was exploring measures that could be taken against individuals responsible for atrocities in Sudan, such as freezing assets held in the USA and denying visas. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Charles Snyder said in a prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
“We do not intend to stand by while violence and atrocities continue in Darfur. Our message to the government of Sudan is clear: Do what is necessary now, and we will work with you. If you do not, there will be consequences. Time is of the essence. Do not doubt our determination.”
Under the N’djamena agreement, the parties to the conflict agreed to allow the deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire. A team of 120 observers, led by the African Union, has been dispatched to Darfur. A mission headquarters has been established in al-Fashir in northern Darfur. The Chairman of the African Union and former president of Mali, Alpha Omar Konare, went on a two day visit to push for progress on enforcing the ceasefire.
On one hand, we see the coming together of nations to save Sudan and its people but on the other hand, we see the self interest of nations coming in with the crisis. Critics of this issue opines that the world's most powerful countries have largely limited their response to expressions of concern and demands that the United Nations take action. The UN, lacking both the funding and military support of the wealthy countries, has left the African Union to deploy a token force without a mandate to protect civilians. On October 16, 2006, Minority Rights Group (MRG) published a critical report, challenging that the UN and the great powers could have prevented the deepening crisis in Darfur and that few lessons appear to have been drawn from their ineptitude during the Rwandan Genocide.
"Human Rights First" claimed that over 90% of the light weapons currently being imported by Sudan and used in the conflict are from China; however, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s "Arms Transfers Data for 2007", between 2003-2007, Sudan received 87 per cent of its major conventional weapons from Russia and 8 per cent from China. Human rights advocates and opponents of the Sudanese government portray China's role in providing weapons and aircraft as a cynical attempt to obtain oil and gas just as colonial powers once supplied African chieftains with the military means to maintain control as they extracted natural resources. According to China's critics, China has offered Sudan support threatening to use its veto on the U.N. Security Council to protect Khartoum from sanctions and has been able to water down every resolution on Darfur in order to protect its interests in Sudan. In response to these allegations, Chinese Ambassador to Sudan Li Chengwen said that "China played an important role in promoting the agreement of the Sudanese government, the African Union and the UN for the deployment of the Hybrid Force in Darfur. China's view is that intensive economic development of the region is a more effective means than harsh economic sanctions, in the effort to stabilize the crisis and alleviate the suffering of the people".
In conclusion, I say that an internal conflict of a state becomes an international concern the moment a great transgression against the right of nation to exist occurs. The world just cannot stand by and watch. The world is a family of nations and all its inhabitants are citizens of such. A national leader’s role does not only limit his/her responsibility or accountability to those belonging to his/her state but that other states have the assurance of quality lives for all its inhabitants, as well.
The conflict began in February of 2003. The conflict has left as many as 400,000 dead from violence and disease. It is estimated that 100,000 have died each year because of government attacks. The Sudan government’s claim that over 9,000 people have been killed is seen as a gross underestimate. As many as 2.5 million are thought to have been displaced as of October, 2006. The Sudanese government has suppressed information by jailing and killing witnesses since 2004 and tampered with evidence such as mass graves to eliminate forensic values. Government forces and allied militia had committed widespread and consistent war crimes and crimes against humanity including murder, torture, mass rape, summary executions and arbitrary detention.The phenomenon has been described in media as the most blatant threat of genocide since Rwanda in 1994. There has even been a description of this situation as “ethnic cleansing or genocide” to connote a forcible transfer or even eradication of a population. The British Government has described the need for a solution as “the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today”.
The civil war that has afflicted the country almost continuously since independence in 1956 can be seen as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the black African, and predominantly Christian or animist, south. At a more detailed level, other features of the conflict emerge. Sudan is ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist2 regime under General Omar Al-Bashir, which has its powerbase in the mainly Arab and Muslim north of the country. The centre and south is inhabited by a mixture of different African linguistic groups, which are mainly Christian or animist. Southern groups, most notably the Dinkadominated Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), have repeatedly sought to gain significant autonomy or independence from Khartoum, and some have resorted to armed struggle to achieve this.
The current conflict has its origins in decades of economic and political marginalisation, and tension over increasingly scarce farmland and water resources. Prolonged drought and desertification in northern Darfur pushed nomadic groups south where they came into conflict over water resources with the farming tribes of the centre. Administrative boundary changes imposed by the predominantly Arab regime in Khartoum served to alienate the farming tribes, as did government backing for the loose collection of ‘Janjaweed’ (or ‘Janjaweit’) nomadic militias, which has come to comprise several thousand fighters of mainly Arab extraction. An influx of modern weaponry in recent decades has increased the loss of life in these disputes. Two predominantly black rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), came to prominence in Darfur during 2003.5 Both groups cited concerns that Darfur would lose out politically and economically in the division of power and resources (particularly oil revenue) between Khartoum and the South, in the event of a settlement in the broader civil war.
Open conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed SLM/A and the JEM took advantage of turmoil within the al-Bashir regime and launched attacks on government military bases. A series of rebel successes ensued during the first half of 2003, before government forces regrouped and responded with a counter-insurgency campaign. Government-backed Janjaweed militia fighters carried out raids on communities suspected of aiding or sympathising with the rebels, and it is the humanitarian impact of these attacks which forms the core of the present crisis.
A 45-day ceasefire was agreed on 8 April 2004 to allow humanitarian access to the displaced population. The N’djamena agreement, which was mediated by Chad, was finalised after a week-long delay caused by disputes over the presence of international observers. The Sudanese Government objected to the involvement of observers from the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, the United States and the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. A compromise was reached under which only the African Union would monitor the political negotiations, and the other observers would be present for discussions on humanitarian issues. The agreement included provisions for a ceasefire commission with international representation, and a commitment from the Sudanese Government to control its allies and ensure their compliance. The parties also agreed to open negotiations on a political solution to the conflict, free all political prisoners, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
The United Nations, has exerted its influence over the crisis by establishing a resolution and initiating actions to achieve the following objectives :
1. to ensure the protection of civilians and to facilitate humanitarian access to the affected population
2. to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and to provide protection for them
3. to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel and their assets.
Intense world influence had been placed on Sudan to end the conflict. In fact, the Bush administration said it was exploring measures that could be taken against individuals responsible for atrocities in Sudan, such as freezing assets held in the USA and denying visas. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Charles Snyder said in a prepared statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
“We do not intend to stand by while violence and atrocities continue in Darfur. Our message to the government of Sudan is clear: Do what is necessary now, and we will work with you. If you do not, there will be consequences. Time is of the essence. Do not doubt our determination.”
Under the N’djamena agreement, the parties to the conflict agreed to allow the deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire. A team of 120 observers, led by the African Union, has been dispatched to Darfur. A mission headquarters has been established in al-Fashir in northern Darfur. The Chairman of the African Union and former president of Mali, Alpha Omar Konare, went on a two day visit to push for progress on enforcing the ceasefire.
On one hand, we see the coming together of nations to save Sudan and its people but on the other hand, we see the self interest of nations coming in with the crisis. Critics of this issue opines that the world's most powerful countries have largely limited their response to expressions of concern and demands that the United Nations take action. The UN, lacking both the funding and military support of the wealthy countries, has left the African Union to deploy a token force without a mandate to protect civilians. On October 16, 2006, Minority Rights Group (MRG) published a critical report, challenging that the UN and the great powers could have prevented the deepening crisis in Darfur and that few lessons appear to have been drawn from their ineptitude during the Rwandan Genocide.
"Human Rights First" claimed that over 90% of the light weapons currently being imported by Sudan and used in the conflict are from China; however, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)'s "Arms Transfers Data for 2007", between 2003-2007, Sudan received 87 per cent of its major conventional weapons from Russia and 8 per cent from China. Human rights advocates and opponents of the Sudanese government portray China's role in providing weapons and aircraft as a cynical attempt to obtain oil and gas just as colonial powers once supplied African chieftains with the military means to maintain control as they extracted natural resources. According to China's critics, China has offered Sudan support threatening to use its veto on the U.N. Security Council to protect Khartoum from sanctions and has been able to water down every resolution on Darfur in order to protect its interests in Sudan. In response to these allegations, Chinese Ambassador to Sudan Li Chengwen said that "China played an important role in promoting the agreement of the Sudanese government, the African Union and the UN for the deployment of the Hybrid Force in Darfur. China's view is that intensive economic development of the region is a more effective means than harsh economic sanctions, in the effort to stabilize the crisis and alleviate the suffering of the people".
In conclusion, I say that an internal conflict of a state becomes an international concern the moment a great transgression against the right of nation to exist occurs. The world just cannot stand by and watch. The world is a family of nations and all its inhabitants are citizens of such. A national leader’s role does not only limit his/her responsibility or accountability to those belonging to his/her state but that other states have the assurance of quality lives for all its inhabitants, as well.
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Territory of the Philippines
On December 10, 1898, the Philippines was ceded by Spain to America and sealed the agreement through the Treaty of Paris. It is in this document that the Philippine territory was defined in Article III, to wit:
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45']) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.
The 1987 Constitution defines the Philippine territory in Article I, to wit:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Territory is defined as the fixed portion on the surface of the earth on which the State settles and over which it has supreme authority. The components of the territory of the state are the terrestrial, fluvial, maritime and aerial domains.
Land Territory (Terrestrial Domain)
The territorial domain refers to the land mass, which may be integrate or dismembered, or partly bound by water or consist of one whole island. It may also be composed of several islands, like the Philippines, which are also known as mid-ocean archipelagos as distinguished from the coastal archipelagoes like Greece.
Maritime Territory (Fluvial and Maritime Domain)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention and the Law of the Sea Treaty (or LOST by its critics), is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place from 1973 through 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention concluded in 1982 replaced four 1958 treaties,namely :
• Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force: 10 September 1964
• Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
• Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
• Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966
UNCLOS came into force in 1994, a year after Guyana became the 60th state to sign the treaty. To date 155 countries and the European Community have joined in the Convention. The United States has signed the treaty, but the Senate has not ratified it. However, it is now regarded as a codification of the Customary international law on the issue.
While the Secretary General of the United Nations receives instruments of ratification and accession and the UN provides support for meetings of states party to the Convention, the UN has no direct operational role in the implementation of the Convention. There is, however, a role played by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Whaling Commission, and the International Seabed Authority (the latter being established by the UN Convention).
The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more than 160 nations participating, the conference lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after the sixtieth state, Guyana, signed the treaty.
The convention introduced a number of provisions. The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes.
The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows:
A. Internal waters
Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. The coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters.
B. Territorial waters
Out to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Vessels were given the right of "innocent passage" through any territorial waters, with strategic straits allowing the passage of military craft as "transit passage", in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures that would be illegal in territorial waters. "Innocent passage" is defined by the convention as passing through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security” of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapons practice, and spying are not “innocent", and submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Nations can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of its security.
C. Archipelagic waters
The convention set the definition of Archipelagic States in Part IV, which also defines how the state can draw its territorial borders. A baseline is drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one another. All waters inside this baseline will be Archipelagic Waters and included as part of the state's internal waters.
D. Contiguous zone
Beyond the 12 nautical mile limit there was a further 12 nautical miles or 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines limit, the contiguous zone, in which a state could continue to enforce laws regarding activities such as smuggling or illegal immigration.
E. Exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
Extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. The success of an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the world, and by 1970 it was technically feasible to operate in waters 4000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.
F. Continental shelf
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends, but it may never exceed 350 nautical miles, or 100 nautical miles beyond 2,500 meter isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters. Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others.
Aside from its provisions defining ocean boundaries, the convention establishes general obligations for safeguarding the marine environment and protecting freedom of scientific research on the high seas, and also creates an innovative legal regime for controlling mineral resource exploitation in deep seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction, through an International Seabed Authority.
Landlocked states are given a right of access to and from the sea, without taxation of traffic through transit states.
Part XI of the Convention provides for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed outside any state's territorial waters or EEZ. It establishes an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to authorize seabed exploration and mining and collect and distribute the seabed mining royalty.
The Philippine position of on the definition of its internal waters is commonly known as the archipelago doctrine. This is articulated in the second sentence of Article I, Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution (see above). Our position is that our islands (as many as 7,100) should be considered one integrated whole instead of being fragmented into separate units each with its own territorial sea. Hence, in defining the internal waters of the archipelago, straight baselines should be drawn to connect appropriate points of the outermost islands without departing to radically from the general direction as one whole territory. The waters inside these baselines shall be considered internal and thus not subject entry by foreign vessels without consent of the local state. The archipelago doctrine has been embodied in the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea, with the modification that archipelagic sealanes shall be designated over the internal waters through which foreign vessels shall have the right of passage.
Arial Domains
This refers to the air space above the land and waters of the State. The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with coordinating and regulating international air travel. The Convention establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration and safety, and details the rights of the signatories in relation to air travel. The Convention also exempts air fuels from tax. The document was signed on December 7, 1944 in Chicago, Illinois, by 52 signatory states. The Convention defines the supreme authority of each state to its airspace. Relevant provisions of the convention relates to such recognition and the elements of a state’s territory, to wit:
Article 1, Sovereignty : The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2,Territory : For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.
The rules governing the high seas also apply to outer space, which is considered res communes. Under customary international law, States have the right to launch satellites in orbit over the territorial space of other States.
The Outer Space Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. The treaty was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 27, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967. As of January 2007, 98 countries are states-parties to the treaty, while another 27 have signed the treaty but have not yet completed ratification.
The Outer Space Treaty represents the basic legal framework of international space law. Among its principles, it bars States Parties to the Treaty from placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications (Art.IV). However, the Treaty does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit.
The treaty explicitly forbids any government from claiming a celestial resource such as the Moon or a planet, since they are province of mankind. Art. II of the Treaty states, in fact, that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means". The pendant for giving up sovereignty in outer space is the jurisdiction and control that the State that launches a space object retains. According to Manfred Lachs jurisdiction and control is giving the means to the State to conduct a mission of space exploration.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty deals with international responsibility, stating that "the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty" and that States Parties shall bear international responsibility for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities.
Following discussions arising from Project West Ford, a consultation clause was inserted in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty: "A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment."
Experts of international space law state that the Moon falls under the legal concept of res communis, which means that it belongs to a group of people, and may be used by every member of the group, but cannot be appropriated by anyone (the concept is also applied to International Waters] The effect of the Outer Space Treaty is to restrict control of private property rights, in the way that the law of the sea prevents anyone owning the sea. This is often disputed by those who claim the ability to sell property rights on the Moon and other bodies, but the dispute has never been tested in a court of law.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45']) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.
The 1987 Constitution defines the Philippine territory in Article I, to wit:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
Territory is defined as the fixed portion on the surface of the earth on which the State settles and over which it has supreme authority. The components of the territory of the state are the terrestrial, fluvial, maritime and aerial domains.
Land Territory (Terrestrial Domain)
The territorial domain refers to the land mass, which may be integrate or dismembered, or partly bound by water or consist of one whole island. It may also be composed of several islands, like the Philippines, which are also known as mid-ocean archipelagos as distinguished from the coastal archipelagoes like Greece.
Maritime Territory (Fluvial and Maritime Domain)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), also called the Law of the Sea Convention and the Law of the Sea Treaty (or LOST by its critics), is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place from 1973 through 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention concluded in 1982 replaced four 1958 treaties,namely :
• Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force: 10 September 1964
• Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
• Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
• Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966
UNCLOS came into force in 1994, a year after Guyana became the 60th state to sign the treaty. To date 155 countries and the European Community have joined in the Convention. The United States has signed the treaty, but the Senate has not ratified it. However, it is now regarded as a codification of the Customary international law on the issue.
While the Secretary General of the United Nations receives instruments of ratification and accession and the UN provides support for meetings of states party to the Convention, the UN has no direct operational role in the implementation of the Convention. There is, however, a role played by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Whaling Commission, and the International Seabed Authority (the latter being established by the UN Convention).
The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more than 160 nations participating, the conference lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after the sixtieth state, Guyana, signed the treaty.
The convention introduced a number of provisions. The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes.
The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows:
A. Internal waters
Covers all water and waterways on the landward side of the baseline. The coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters.
B. Territorial waters
Out to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, the coastal state is free to set laws, regulate use, and use any resource. Vessels were given the right of "innocent passage" through any territorial waters, with strategic straits allowing the passage of military craft as "transit passage", in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures that would be illegal in territorial waters. "Innocent passage" is defined by the convention as passing through waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not “prejudicial to the peace, good order or the security” of the coastal state. Fishing, polluting, weapons practice, and spying are not “innocent", and submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Nations can also temporarily suspend innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial seas, if doing so is essential for the protection of its security.
C. Archipelagic waters
The convention set the definition of Archipelagic States in Part IV, which also defines how the state can draw its territorial borders. A baseline is drawn between the outermost points of the outermost islands, subject to these points being sufficiently close to one another. All waters inside this baseline will be Archipelagic Waters and included as part of the state's internal waters.
D. Contiguous zone
Beyond the 12 nautical mile limit there was a further 12 nautical miles or 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines limit, the contiguous zone, in which a state could continue to enforce laws regarding activities such as smuggling or illegal immigration.
E. Exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
Extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was also becoming important. The success of an offshore oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the world, and by 1970 it was technically feasible to operate in waters 4000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of the coastal states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.
F. Continental shelf
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends, but it may never exceed 350 nautical miles, or 100 nautical miles beyond 2,500 meter isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters. Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others.
Aside from its provisions defining ocean boundaries, the convention establishes general obligations for safeguarding the marine environment and protecting freedom of scientific research on the high seas, and also creates an innovative legal regime for controlling mineral resource exploitation in deep seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction, through an International Seabed Authority.
Landlocked states are given a right of access to and from the sea, without taxation of traffic through transit states.
Part XI of the Convention provides for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed outside any state's territorial waters or EEZ. It establishes an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to authorize seabed exploration and mining and collect and distribute the seabed mining royalty.
The Philippine position of on the definition of its internal waters is commonly known as the archipelago doctrine. This is articulated in the second sentence of Article I, Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution (see above). Our position is that our islands (as many as 7,100) should be considered one integrated whole instead of being fragmented into separate units each with its own territorial sea. Hence, in defining the internal waters of the archipelago, straight baselines should be drawn to connect appropriate points of the outermost islands without departing to radically from the general direction as one whole territory. The waters inside these baselines shall be considered internal and thus not subject entry by foreign vessels without consent of the local state. The archipelago doctrine has been embodied in the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea, with the modification that archipelagic sealanes shall be designated over the internal waters through which foreign vessels shall have the right of passage.
Arial Domains
This refers to the air space above the land and waters of the State. The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the Chicago Convention, established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations charged with coordinating and regulating international air travel. The Convention establishes rules of airspace, aircraft registration and safety, and details the rights of the signatories in relation to air travel. The Convention also exempts air fuels from tax. The document was signed on December 7, 1944 in Chicago, Illinois, by 52 signatory states. The Convention defines the supreme authority of each state to its airspace. Relevant provisions of the convention relates to such recognition and the elements of a state’s territory, to wit:
Article 1, Sovereignty : The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2,Territory : For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.
The rules governing the high seas also apply to outer space, which is considered res communes. Under customary international law, States have the right to launch satellites in orbit over the territorial space of other States.
The Outer Space Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty that forms the basis of international space law. The treaty was opened for signature in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on January 27, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967. As of January 2007, 98 countries are states-parties to the treaty, while another 27 have signed the treaty but have not yet completed ratification.
The Outer Space Treaty represents the basic legal framework of international space law. Among its principles, it bars States Parties to the Treaty from placing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or to otherwise station them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications (Art.IV). However, the Treaty does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit.
The treaty explicitly forbids any government from claiming a celestial resource such as the Moon or a planet, since they are province of mankind. Art. II of the Treaty states, in fact, that "outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means". The pendant for giving up sovereignty in outer space is the jurisdiction and control that the State that launches a space object retains. According to Manfred Lachs jurisdiction and control is giving the means to the State to conduct a mission of space exploration.
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty deals with international responsibility, stating that "the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty" and that States Parties shall bear international responsibility for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities.
Following discussions arising from Project West Ford, a consultation clause was inserted in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty: "A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment."
Experts of international space law state that the Moon falls under the legal concept of res communis, which means that it belongs to a group of people, and may be used by every member of the group, but cannot be appropriated by anyone (the concept is also applied to International Waters] The effect of the Outer Space Treaty is to restrict control of private property rights, in the way that the law of the sea prevents anyone owning the sea. This is often disputed by those who claim the ability to sell property rights on the Moon and other bodies, but the dispute has never been tested in a court of law.
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
United Nations
United Nations Members
(source : United Nations website)
I. General Asembly
Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. Comprising all 192 Members of the United Nations, it provides a forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. The Assembly meets in regular session intensively from September to December each year, and thereafter as required.
According to the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly may:
. Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation
for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament;
. Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and,
except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the
Security Council, make recommendations on it;
. Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any
questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and
functions of any organ of the United Nations;
. Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international
political cooperation, the development and codification of
international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and international collaboration in the economic, social,
humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields;
. Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that
might impair friendly relations among nations;
. Receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other United
Nations organs;
. Consider and approve the United Nations budget and establish the
financial assessments of Member States;
. Elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members
of other United Nations councils and organs and, on the recommendation
of the Security Council, appoint the Secretary-General.
President of the General Assembly
A seasoned diplomat, economist, scholar and businessman, Dr. Kerim brings with him a wealth of experience in international political and economic affairs and extensive knowledge of the United Nations system. From 2000 to 2001, Dr. Kerim was Foreign Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in which capacity he also served as Chairman of the South-East European Cooperation Process. He then became his country's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, from 2001 to 2003, during which time he served as vice-chairman both of the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002). In addition, he was a member of the group of facilitators of the President of the fifty-sixth UN General Assembly, focusing on UN reform, and was a co-organizer of the Regional Forum on Dialogue of Civilizations (Ohrid, 2003).
II. Security Council
Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:
• to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the United Nations;
• to investigate any dispute or situation which mightlead to international
friction;
• to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of
settlement;
• to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate
armaments;
• to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression
and to recommend what action should be taken;
• to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not
involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
• to take military action against an aggressor;
• to recommend the admission of new Members;
• to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations
in "strategic areas";
• to recommend to the GeneralAssembly the appointment of the Secretary-
General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the
International Court of Justice.
The Council is composed of five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — and ten non-permament members (with year of term's end):
1. Belgium (2008)
2. Indonesia (2008)
3. South Africa (2008)
4. Burkina Faso (2009)
5. Italy (2008)
6. Viet Nam (2009)
7. Costa Rica (2009)
8. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (2009)
9. Croatia (2009)
10.Panama (2008)
The Presidency of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President holds office for one calendar month. Ten non-permament members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms and not eligible for immediate re-election. The number of non-permanent members was increased from six to ten by an amendment of the Charter which came into force in 1965. Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" power. Under the Charter, all Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out.
The Secretary - General
Ban Ki-moon of the Republic of Korea, the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations, brings to his post 37 years of service both in government and on the global stage. At the time of his election as Secretary-General, Mr. Ban was his country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His long tenure with the ministry included postings in New Delhi, Washington D.C. and Vienna, and responsibility for a variety of portfolios, including Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, Chief National Security Advisor to the President, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and Director-General of American Affairs. Throughout this service, his guiding vision was that of a peaceful Korean peninsula, playing an expanding role for peace and prosperity in the region and the wider world.
The Deputy Secretary - General
Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro of Tanzania took office as Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 February 2007. She is the third Deputy Secretary-General to be appointed since the post was established in 1997.
Dr. Migiro served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation from 2006-2007 -- the first woman in the United Republic of Tanzania to hold that position since its independence in 1961. Before that, she was Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children for five years.
As Foreign Minister, Dr. Migiro spearheaded Tanzania 's engagement in the pursuit of peace, security and development in the Great Lakes Region. She served as Chair of the Council of Ministers' meetings of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, a process that culminated into a Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region.
(source : United Nations website)
I. General Asembly
Established in 1945 under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations. Comprising all 192 Members of the United Nations, it provides a forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law. The Assembly meets in regular session intensively from September to December each year, and thereafter as required.
According to the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly may:
. Consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation
for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament;
. Discuss any question relating to international peace and security and,
except where a dispute or situation is currently being discussed by the
Security Council, make recommendations on it;
. Discuss, with the same exception, and make recommendations on any
questions within the scope of the Charter or affecting the powers and
functions of any organ of the United Nations;
. Initiate studies and make recommendations to promote international
political cooperation, the development and codification of
international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and international collaboration in the economic, social,
humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields;
. Make recommendations for the peaceful settlement of any situation that
might impair friendly relations among nations;
. Receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other United
Nations organs;
. Consider and approve the United Nations budget and establish the
financial assessments of Member States;
. Elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members
of other United Nations councils and organs and, on the recommendation
of the Security Council, appoint the Secretary-General.
President of the General Assembly
A seasoned diplomat, economist, scholar and businessman, Dr. Kerim brings with him a wealth of experience in international political and economic affairs and extensive knowledge of the United Nations system. From 2000 to 2001, Dr. Kerim was Foreign Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in which capacity he also served as Chairman of the South-East European Cooperation Process. He then became his country's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, from 2001 to 2003, during which time he served as vice-chairman both of the International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, 2002) and of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002). In addition, he was a member of the group of facilitators of the President of the fifty-sixth UN General Assembly, focusing on UN reform, and was a co-organizer of the Regional Forum on Dialogue of Civilizations (Ohrid, 2003).
II. Security Council
Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:
• to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the United Nations;
• to investigate any dispute or situation which mightlead to international
friction;
• to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of
settlement;
• to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate
armaments;
• to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression
and to recommend what action should be taken;
• to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not
involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
• to take military action against an aggressor;
• to recommend the admission of new Members;
• to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations
in "strategic areas";
• to recommend to the GeneralAssembly the appointment of the Secretary-
General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the
International Court of Justice.
The Council is composed of five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — and ten non-permament members (with year of term's end):
1. Belgium (2008)
2. Indonesia (2008)
3. South Africa (2008)
4. Burkina Faso (2009)
5. Italy (2008)
6. Viet Nam (2009)
7. Costa Rica (2009)
8. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (2009)
9. Croatia (2009)
10.Panama (2008)
The Presidency of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the English alphabetical order of their names. Each President holds office for one calendar month. Ten non-permament members, elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms and not eligible for immediate re-election. The number of non-permanent members was increased from six to ten by an amendment of the Charter which came into force in 1965. Each Council member has one vote. Decisions on procedural matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least nine of the 15 members. Decisions on substantive matters require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the rule of "great Power unanimity", often referred to as the "veto" power. Under the Charter, all Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out.
The Secretary - General
Ban Ki-moon of the Republic of Korea, the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations, brings to his post 37 years of service both in government and on the global stage. At the time of his election as Secretary-General, Mr. Ban was his country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. His long tenure with the ministry included postings in New Delhi, Washington D.C. and Vienna, and responsibility for a variety of portfolios, including Foreign Policy Advisor to the President, Chief National Security Advisor to the President, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and Director-General of American Affairs. Throughout this service, his guiding vision was that of a peaceful Korean peninsula, playing an expanding role for peace and prosperity in the region and the wider world.
The Deputy Secretary - General
Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro of Tanzania took office as Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 February 2007. She is the third Deputy Secretary-General to be appointed since the post was established in 1997.
Dr. Migiro served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation from 2006-2007 -- the first woman in the United Republic of Tanzania to hold that position since its independence in 1961. Before that, she was Minister for Community Development, Gender and Children for five years.
As Foreign Minister, Dr. Migiro spearheaded Tanzania 's engagement in the pursuit of peace, security and development in the Great Lakes Region. She served as Chair of the Council of Ministers' meetings of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, a process that culminated into a Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region.
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